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As I discussed in an earlier Perspective,
1
 the use of investment incentives is pervasive 
and growing. The most recent example of a big bidding war was when Boeing 
threatened to move production of its 777-X aircraft out of Washington state, 
prompting some 20 states to offer incentive packages to the company (including $1.7 
billion from Missouri). In the end, Washington gave Boeing a package of tax 
incentives worth a record-breaking $8.7 billion over the 2025 – 2040 period to stay, 
and the unions made substantial concessions regarding pensions. 
 
What can be done to control such auctions, which are often international in scope? 
The most robust control method, regional in scope, is embodied in the European 
Union (EU) Guidelines on Regional Aid. These rules guarantee transparency, set 
variable limits (in terms of “aid intensity,” which equals subsidy/investment) for aid 
levels based on each region’s per capita income, and reduce the value of aid to large 
investment projects over €50 million. They require projects to stay at least five years 
and mandate the use of clawbacks for firms that fail to meet their commitments in 
investment contracts. Moreover, the guidelines provide demerits for firms in a 
dominant position in their industry, although they do not mandate a particular 
reduction in aid. 
 
The other international control measure comes under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. While these rules are 
more tailored to production subsidies than to investment incentives, the latter 
certainly come under the purview of the Agreement as well, as illustrated by the EU’s 
successful complaint against subsidies for Boeing in the states of Washington, Illinois 
and Kansas. 
 
However, this case also illustrates the limits of WTO subsidy control. The EU has 
already filed a compliance complaint,
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 and there is little likelihood the United States 
(US) will comply anytime soon (the US Trade Representative’s office claims that the 
US has complied, but as long as the state and local tax credits continue in Washington 
state, that is not correct). Indeed, as mentioned, Washington state has approved a new 
round of subsidies for Boeing that is likely to initiate a new WTO dispute.  
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In addition, while the WTO rules require frequent notification of subsidies, there is no 
penalty for failure to notify, with the result that subsidy notifications are of very 
uneven quality. Federal states outside the EU frequently make poor quality 
notifications regarding subnational subsidies. Finally, the TRIMs and GATS 
agreements regulate performance requirements, but not investment incentives. 
 
What, then, can be done against incentives competition? First, there must be 
continuing efforts to improve the transparency of location subsidies. This is necessary 
for jurisdictions to make effective investment promotion policy (especially in a region 
such as the European Union and the United States, where there are many competing 
governments) as well as for international policy discussion. 
 
Second, the EU’s example shows that incorporating subsidies rules into regional 
agreements can be a fruitful way to bring bidding wars under control. For many 
products, such as automobile assembly and steel, corporate location decisions still 
focus on a single region, meaning that such rules would be geographically 
comprehensive enough for a variety of industries. Consequently, major 
stakeholders—including the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, the World Association of Investment Promotion 
Agencies, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development—should unite in promoting location 
subsidy guidelines within regional trade areas. There are no doubt numerous other 
non-governmental organizations that would endorse such a move. 
 
Third, WTO notifications should be strengthened. Incomplete notifications should be 
flagged and countries involved should be pressured to give cost estimates for 
subsidies at all levels of government. Still, it is difficult to envision that sanctions for 
non-compliance will be introduced. 
 
Fourth, no-raiding zones could be a first step for countries to negotiate controls over 
investment subsidies. A no-raiding agreement simply commits a state to not give a 
subsidy to relocate an existing facility from another state; it would not apply to new 
investments. Their track record is mixed—several agreements among US states are 
failing quickly, but Australia (2003-2011) and Canada (1994-present) have been more 
successful.
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 Despite these mixed results, it is easier to demonstrate to policymakers 
the futility of relocation subsidies, since they create no new jobs, than it is to do for 
incentives for new investment, which could make this a more feasible first step. 
 
Though national and subnational jurisdictions have incentives to offer location 
subsidies, these proposed measures would help keep their value to more reasonable 
levels with a lower likelihood of distorting competition and international investment 
flows. 
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